Alongside unhelpful images and memories, Britain experienced in the 1980s and 1990s more open anti-German prejudice among her rulers than at any time since 1945. Within the broader aim of reasserting Britain internationally, Margaret Thatcher*) and some of her senior ministers harboured deep personal suspicion of everything German.
    Though these were mainly open secrets to be deduced from their pronouncements, in 1989-92 they erupted to the surface. Unlike near-contemporaries who themselves had fought against Germany and come back keen to ensure that no such war should ever happen again, Thatcher never got over the experience of being a civilian threatened by the Luftwaffe. As Prime Minister she was constantly amazed that those around her did not share her views and sought advisers who did, notably her private secretary Charles Powell. When consulting historians chosen for their expertise on post-war Germany, she lectured them on what they ought to be advising her to do, generally what she already intended; [...] Challenged for her views, she announced that she did not believe in “national guilt”, adding, “but I do believe in national character”.
    Reminded of the size of Germany’s contribution to the EU budget, she responded, “it’s always been a misnomer to say that the Germans are the paymasters of Europe. The Germans have been simply paying reparations for all the things they did during the war.” Nor was she comforted by West Germany’s economic strength, which had sustained democracy since 1945, for she “never believed that German nationalism was dead”; younger Germans were sure to seek reunification and make their country again the dominant force in Europe. [...] She was unlucky therefore to be the premier who was forced to carry out the pledge to support the reunification of Germany given by her post-war predecessors [...].